Zimbabwe’s Reconfigured Political Economy: The New Site for Electoral Battlelines and Political Contestation

Zimbabwe’s Reconfigured Political Economy: The New Site for Electoral Battlelines and Political Contestation

Zimbabwe’s 2018 electoral battlelines will largely be based on Professor Raftopoulos’ (2014) reconfigured political economy. Whilst electoral manipulation has played a key role in maintaining the domination of ZANU PF in electoral politics, it will be foolhardy to ignore the processes of new class formation post-fast track land reform and how that is creating new social classes with their own set of electoral demands. In essence, beyond the elections rigging and unfairness narrative, there is a need to interrogate the socio-economic and political terrain since 2000 and interpret its meaning to the democratisation project. In as much as the fragmented opposition seems to be slowly morphing into a coalition while on the other hand the ruling elites are tearing each other apart as the contest for the future beyond the ‘dear leader’ takes firm hold, it may create false impressions of the imminent defeat of ZANU PF in the 2018 elections. These surface conflicts might hide from the analyst some very important realities about Zimbabwe’s electoral field and crucially a cursory look at these conflicts does not reveal the ‘structural forces’ that must be understood for those seeking a political practice different from the current authoritarian template. 

 

NERA Uniting the opposition: but is that enough?

Our interest in this article is to briefly try and expand, a debate that was ignited by Professor Brian Raftopoulos when he observed that Zimbabwe now has a ‘reconfigured political economy’ Or what Professor Ian Phimister and Dr Rory Pilossof have called the ‘fall of wage labor’ in Zimbabwe or ‘de-proletarianization’. The causes of this reconfiguration is related to broadly four processes: (i) the post-independent stagnation if not decadence of the liberation project under the former liberation movement; (ii) the de-industrialization of the 1990s which was triggered by the implementation of the Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP); (iii) the ‘jambanja political economy’ whose hallmark has been fast track land reform and a somewhat re-radicalisation of the ruling elite towards indigenisation and (iv) the political contestation which was marked by the rise of the ZCTU, NCA and eventually the MDC.

To begin with, the above has led to a perverse decimation of working class power especially because the formal employment sector has totally collapsed and the radical, very organized, institutionalised side of the working-class movement was eroded. In the 1990s as the ZCTU asserted more independence especially in the urban areas other social forces, students, churches, human rights NGOs and to some extent the women’s movement tended to coalesce around the class power of the MDC. This class power was often projected against the ruling elites and was critical of things like the rising cost of living, endemic corruption, collapse of social services, the authoritarian nature of the post-independent government. This political power expressed itself vigorously and slowly became an alternative political project in the form of the NCA and eventually the MDC – there was numerical advantage – boycotts, marches and labour led protests made the ruling elites retreat on key questions.

‘New’ Farmers and the Search for Stability: between the party-state and statues

The evidence of how chaotic the land reform was and the devastating effect it had on the economy is widely recorded - one just has to look at the hyperinflation; the mass exodus of Zimbabweans into the diaspora and the adoption of a ‘foreign currency’ and a surrogate currency. Underneath this surface is an emerging reality which cannot be ignored: amidst the corruption, the many farms owned by the elites, the collapse of state agricultural services like Agricultural Extension (AGRITEX) and Cold Storage Commission Service (CSC) there are thousands of new farmers that are slowly emerging – the tobacco farmers – Professor Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros, and Ian Scoones have made observations on this new emergent class. These new farmers don’t have tenure and their only source of protection is the party-state – the ruling elites are aware that if they were to issue title deeds, compensate white famers and let new farmers access credit lines and participate in a ‘land market’ they would have unleashed an accumulation project so vast and so extensive and they will lose control over it. 

 

A woman farmer at the Tobacco Auction Floors

In the meantime, they do every silly delay as possible: experiment with ‘bankable’ leases; try and use cattle to access finance and when this fails they resort to ‘command agriculture’ - the intention here is to keep these farmers directly under the control of the party-state. How far they will succeed in ‘annihilating’ the logic of accumulation in which the A1 farmer really wants to be a big player is another question, but they can only postpone the inevitable: unless Zimbabwe turns very socialist, like Cuba. However, it is worthy to note that Cuba has already signaled towards shifting its policies.  The logic of capital will eventually burst through and when it does it will upset the ruling class’ hold on the social structure, after that the deluge. Yet the political formations outside the state are not paying enough, if ever any attention to these ‘class formation dynamics’ and this is dangerous - how many farms, how many new farmers, how many tobacco farmers, how many benefited from command agriculture. So, the question is: if I were a ‘new’ farmer seated on my untitled land, getting command inputs or Presidential Input Support Scheme, whom or what will I vote for in the 2018 elections?

Makorokoza: Small Scale Mining and the Scourge of Declined Formal Mining

One characteristic of Zimbabwe’s contemporary political economy is the decline of corporations mining for gold and the increase of makorokoza or small scale miners and at present these small-scale miners have become central to gold production. At one point ZIMRA wanted to garnish the accounts of these miners and the RBZ quickly intervened arguing that they are not to be touched because they are a major source of export earnings from the gold. The fear was that taxing them will drive them into the black market and the state would drastically lose revenue.  The mines have been mothballed, Zimbabwe’s gold production declined and now its rising but the structure has changed as official statistics indicate that since 2015 artisanal miners have been contributing 40% of the gold output. Therefore, the party-state is very busy ingratiating themselves to this class which is roughly estimated to be around or above 400,000 across the country. The Environmental Management Agency (EMA) sees them as a ‘pollution risk’ – but there is also a colonial relic here – mining was associated with the ‘big corporates’ and foreign capital going back to the British South Africa Company (BSAC) time – meaning the formal state structures are biased towards the ZIMPLATS, RIO, IMPALA etc – not the villager scrounging for a few grams on the river bank and on the ‘claim’. 

Diamond panners in Marange.

Dr Mawowa has done a study of the economic and political power that these have gained – yet for those in the opposition the makorokoza is an aberration, a return to the ‘stone age’. They do not bother to look at the question: if I was a makorokoza, with a few claims, who would I vote for? Therefore, it is imperative for the opposition to engage the artisanal miners given the numerics of close to half a million adults.  

Cross Border Traders, Urban Vendors and Informality

As the formal economy collapsed many have sought refuge in cross-border trading activity – these have varied over the last decade but it is mostly female headed and consists of traders buying low in South Africa, Zambia, Mozambique and as far as Tanzania and selling high in Zimbabwe. The state has started attempting to penetrate these cross-border trader class by dangling incentives like the RBZ $15m incentive, showing a good reading and understanding of the new power blocs in the society. If we are to take the number of people engaged in crossborder traders, the numbers become very significant. These are the questions that those seeking political office need to engage with, coming up with viable tangible policy alternatives that seek to better the lives of these social groups. 

Cross-border traders offloading their merchandise.

In addition, the pervasiveness of this informality is nakedly and glaringly across all the country, whether it is in the urban areas or rural areas. There is petty-commodity trading ranging from foodstuffs, second hand clothing and shoes, household utensils or anything that is sellable. The rank marshals and touts also presents another sector of informality, where the state has had to make retreats in certain cases especially when they had national protests in 2016 against their deliberate targeting by the police. Instead, the police had to expand it collecting net by shifting towards general motoring public. All these cases point to the fact that in as much as the ruling ZANU PF has sought to capture these groups into its power domination matrix, it has not successfully done so because of the cat and mouse games that these subaltern social groups have with state agencies and officials. For an opposition or civil society official seeking social change, the question becomes addressing the concerns of these informality actors.

New Social Movements and the Forgotten (Slippery) Youth Bulge

In the thick of these social class is a very fluid structure: that of the urban youth who are sometimes touched and sometimes not touched by the ‘new social movements’. We argued before that these new social movements are using social media to create counter-cultural and potentially counter-authoritarian spaces but this must not blind one to the reality of the ‘ghetto youth’; with access to limited opportunities and restricted access to internet. These youths are often found at the ‘Dancehall shows’ which are filled with thousands.  The music that they belt out is full of social commentary that brings to the attention of the public the daily lived struggles for livelihoods in these poor communities. They sing complaining of the excesses of the municipal police and national police force, how the society has become corrupt, unemployment and the bleak future ahead. For Instance, Winky-D’s song Twenty-Five (25) brings attention to the challenges facing unemployed graduates and the hopelessness of life they are facing. It is not only in the ghetto youth out there who has to be paid attention to, but there are also the youth from the affluent suburbs and millennials in general. The traction of charismatic techno-savvy actors such as #ThisFlag points to how varied the voices yearning for social change have become. In our maiden Gravitas issue, we argued that terrain and actors are slowly shifting and needs to be understood well by proponents of social change. It is estimated that only 8% of registered youth voted in the 2013 elections and close to 2 million of eligible voters were not registered. At present, it is estimated that close to two thirds of the population is below 40 years, and going into the 2018 and 2023 elections, young people will be a key voting bloc. Therefore, an electoral strategy missing a message how to address the concerns of the variegated youth bulge, how to get them to register and interested in the vote will most likely prolong the journey in the wilderness.

Twists and Turns: the paradoxes, contradictions and beyond NERA

In this article, we have attempted to reveal the political ‘import’ of Professor Brian Raftopoulos’ ‘reconfigured political economy’ and we have pointed that contemporary and future electoral contestations, including civil society contentions, will be argued out and shaped by a vastly different social structure from that of the 1990s.  

An airtime vendor wooing customers on Groombridge road

An immediate criticism might be that these classes are very ‘dirty’ meaning they are not pure in the sense of being clearly demarcated yet that is the point here: social classes never appear pure and without being imbricated in other classes (i.e. the new farmer is still married to subsistence economy and at the same time is seeking escape) yet make no mistake about it they are becoming aware of their power and marrying it to the party-state so as to extract as much benefit as possible (doesn’t every class depend on the state though? In the noise and dances of this rubble of a collapsed economy are emerging new realities, away from the urban ensemble, and those with keen political eyes must pay heed. The NERA, the new social movement and the ‘modern’ sector has limited power and this reality must be borne – the ‘new farmer’ wants to participate in the established markets for goods; the tobacco farmer wants a functional credit system; the financiers want a functional ‘land market’; this is the reality, but the big question lies in how will those seeking for power in the 2018 elections provide solutions? The very laborious and often bloody political terrain that the ruling elites have fostered on the body polity makes it possible for those seeking change to become, deliberately or otherwise become bogged down in the fleeting ephemeral sound of slogans and self-righteousness and technicalities of the voting processes alone while ignoring or at least paying no attention to the ‘structure’ of Zimbabwe’s political economy. The consequence can be Moses’ disaster: of taking 40 years in the wilderness before reaching Canaan. How social classes form, the social and political processes attendant to that process; how social classes ‘disintegrate’ and reform themselves voluntarily or otherwise; how they accumulate and lose power; and how the state relates to them is of fundamental importance in any future electoral contest in Zimbabwe. 

One of NERA Chief Architects: Will they see beyond electoral fraud?

Elections are not only about the technicalities of the voting process, but also consist of the socio-economic and political forces that inform and condition voting behaviour patterns. Therefore, whilst NERA has managed to highlight the deficiencies of the electoral system, it is in no way a political and economic programme that may inform or condition the social groups identified in this article to go vote and let alone for the opposition. To the Makorokoza how they will be able to continue or expand their gold scrounging activities; the cross border traders, how they will be able to bring their merchandise with less hassle from ZIMRA; the Commuter omnibus operators, how they will be protected from the marauding police on the roads and the new farmers, how they will have access to inputs, markets and cash after selling produce will most likely give compelling reasons to the electorate on why it is necessary to register and vote for change. It is the political economy, stupid!

Notice from Editors.

Next Week’s Gravitas will seek to unpack, expand and deepen the debate on the reconfigured political economy and draw lessons or insights on what this may mean for the pro-democracy movement in the 2018 elections. Therefore, we call for opinion editorial pieces of between 1300-1500. Articles may focus on, but not limited to the following:

·         Social classes, power and elections

·         Political parties’ manifestos, ideologies and key national questions

·         Civil society, elections and social change

·         Gender contestations, women empowerment and elections

·         Commodification of elections and electoral accountability

Articles, subject to editing and reviewing, are to be emailed to the following addresses by 1300hrs, Thursday 27^th of April 2017: gravitas@ipazim.com. 

Gravitas Call for Articles: Electoral Contestations in Zimbabwe: ‘New’ Social Classes and Search for Transformation

Electoral Contestations in Zimbabwe: ‘New’ Social Classes and Search for Transformation

Zimbabwe’s current political contestations have been largely shaped by the conflict lines between a liberation movement that has turned authoritarian and an opposition movement which has advanced ‘social democracy’ as an alternative.  On one hand the ruling elites marshalled state power to effect a fast track track land reform while closing down on democratic space and those outside the ‘party-state’ coalesced around the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) and finally the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in September 1999. At the formation of the NCA and MDC, Zimbabwe’s economy was highly formalised and most of the labour force unionised meaning there was a considerable ‘labour class power’ . 

The economic structural adjustment of the 1990s  and the Fast Track Land Reform led to the decimation of unionised labour.  In its stead this has been replaced by ‘New Farmers’,  a pervasive informal sector, cross border traders, small scale mining  and petty trading.  Professor Brian Raftopoulos pointed that Zimbabwe is now characterised by a ‘reconfigured political economy’ (See the article titled ‘Zimbabwean Politics in the Post-2013 Election Period’,  in the journal Africa Spectrum number 49 Vol 2, 91- 103).  This question has attracted research interest from scholars but the political effect of that has not been interpreted into the political practices of the broadly defined ‘pro-democracy movement’. The nature of this reconfiguration has meant the erosion of the power of the social forces that had been instrumental to social and political influence of  the NCA,  the  ZCTU and formed the power base of the ‘democratic movement’.  Our interest is to explore the character of this ‘reconfigured political economy’ and ask questions about what this means for  contemporary and future electoral politics, political change, economic transformation and active citizenship.

Gravitas therefore calls for opinion editorial pieces of between 1300-1500 words that seek to unpack, expand and deepen the debate on the reconfigured political economy and draw lessons or insights on what this may mean for the pro-democracy movement in the 2018 elections.

Articles may focus on, but not limited to the following:

·         Social classes, power and elections

·         Political parties’ manifestos, ideologies and key national questions

·         Civil society, elections and social change

·         Gender contestations, women empowerment and elections

·         Commodification of elections and electoral accountability

Articles, subject to editing and reviewing, are to be emailed to the following addresses by 1300hrs, Thursday 27^th of April 2017: gravitas@ipazim.com. 

Gravitas Independence Issue: Power, Politics and the Liberation Promise in Zimbabwe

Gravitas Volume 1. Issue 6:  Independence Edition

Reflections on the National Question: Land, Transformation and Progress? Dr Toendepi Shonhe*

As Zimbabwe celebrates 37 years of independence and as the country marks 16 years after the land reform, is it time to reflect on power, transformation and progress? The nexus of power, transformation and progress cannot be effective without bringing the national question into the debate in Zimbabwe. In their 2011 book, Reclaiming the Nation the Return of the National Question in Africa, Asia and Latin America, Moyo and Yeros asserted that fractured states (such as Zimbabwe), perhaps not failed, have the inseparable twin burden of struggling to obtain political independence and economic liberation despite having won freedom from the Empires as integral dimensions of the national question. The land question - the plenary being the national question - having been the root cause of the liberation war, remains central to the economic and social disarticulation manifesting today. A structural analysis of Zimbabwe’s circumstances 37 years after independence is opportune, beyond the liberties and non-substantive democracy outcries.

Zimbabwe inherited a disarticulated white settler economy in 1980, producing and exporting raw-material from mining and agriculture. This was perpetuated under the Lancaster House constitution, whose badly negotiated provisions promoted the retention of the status quo. Zimbabwe’s political economy was characterized by what Guy Mhone called the ‘enclave economy’ meaning a small modern sector imposed on a largely non-capitalist social structure. This debate has been extended by Dr G Kanyenze and researchers at LEDRIZ where they have argued that Zimbabwe must go ‘beyond the enclave’. Others such as de Janvry have characterised this as functional dualism; where a dialectical relationship between the traditional and modern economy exist congenially and often within the same spaces. Under a functional dualistic economy the peasant is exploited by the capital from the modern world and is left poorer.

Fig. 1.0 Zimbabwe’s Economy: Now Dominated by Vendors and Informality

The subsequent land reform of 2000 should be seen as an inevitable effort to correct the past injustices of colonialism and a redistributive effort towards democratising land ownership by the majority. Inevitably, the 2013 Constitution acknowledges the irreversibility of the 2000 land reform process. The questions of methodology and effectiveness of outcome are legitimate and so is the challenge on the chaotic nature of the process. The purpose of this article is to situate the land and agrarian reform in the power and transformation matrix as we mark 37 years of political independence. The failure by the ruling Zanu PF in the second decade (following the lapse of the Lancaster House restrictions) to deal with mass demand for land and wealth redistribution led to mass discontent, leading to an outward search for alternative leadership as the 1997-2000 developments confirmed. However, the failure to comprehend the broad ideological debate about the land question gave the ruling elite an advantage over the newly formed opposition from 2000.

Mass Discontent: the rise and ‘decline’ of the MDC?

Rather than aligning with the war veterans who pushed for land repossession, the MDC was co-opted into a ‘neo-liberal’ agenda focusing mainly on democracy and liberties, in spite of their initial more radical position on land repossession than ZANU PF and pronouncements in the 2000 MDC Manifesto. One war veteran involved in the­­ formation of the MDC and in development of initial policies confirmed that some proponents of radical redistributive politics were left behind in the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) leading to hijacking of policy direction. Evidently, contradiction between capital and workers led to fragmentations and eventual loss of political muscle, prospects of rejuvenation are remote and perhaps a figment of imagination without re-thinking how social justice issues are married to political liberties. The axing of Munyaradzi Gwisai after making radical contributions on land in parliament sent contradictory signals to the landless movement in Zimbabwe. The slippery position of the MDC was captured by Bond and Manyanya who stated the ideological contradictions of the movement perhaps constituted a ‘false start’. The resettled farmers, part of the 4.5 million registered voters as recently noted Dr Philani Zamchiya, have not received a clear and unambiguous message from the opposition contingent regarding their newly acquired asset (land) and seem to find comfort in retaining the ruling party as ‘security of tenure’.

New Class Formations and Power Matrices?

Consequently, in my recent study in Hwedza district, I observed that many plot owners are ‘secure’ and have not received any threat of evictions in the last 15 years. Instead, the farmers worry about funding and markets for their produce. Many are moving above the poverty datum line. All these variables point to a changing dynamic where solutions are fast escaping the ‘modernity’ paradigm that had dominated political and economic discourses in the 1990s and early 2000 and have shifted mainly to non-urban based political formations  which have been captured by Zanu PF.

1.2 Class Formations : Will the New Farmers Accumulate Beyond Subsistence ?

More penetrating analysis of the collap4se of the modern economy have been observed by Brian Raftopoulos who has argued that the post-2013 terrain portray a ‘reconfigured political economy’ especially marked by the demise of working class power as a result of de-industrialisation. In some interesting retreats the government recently removed a requirement that farmers without ‘tax certificates’ must surrender 10% to ZIMRA; the party-state made a hasty retreat and quickly rescinded the notice. This is the second time that the government has made a hasty retreat; when farmers protested wanting to have access to their cash, the government gave notice that the farmers can access up to US$1000 in the bank. This amount is almost 400% of what the ordinary citizen can access in cash if lucky. That the government has been making haste decisions in favour of the ‘new farmers’ is evidence of a shift in political and social power which must not escape our notice. In the 1990s when Zimbabwe still had a significant industrial base it was the ZCTU which confronted the party-state relying on its social and political power as a working class organization. Effectively meaning the methods and tactics of organizing which accompanied the rise of MDC anchored in working class power have been superseded by a more fluid political economy dominated by these new social classes found in the re-configured economy (New Farmers, Cross-Border Traders, Amakorokoza, Vendors among many others).

Transition Terrain Now Shifted Back to ZANU PF?

Sadly, rather than rejuvenating opposition politics, the new order identifies a possible future within succession politics. Within this framework, some of the opposition sympathisers are bidding for a preferred succession outcome within Zanu PF. We are in a new era where paradoxically, hope has gone back to failing Zanu PF, catastrophic as it may. The opposition eluded the national question: the land question and attendant unequal economic relations and lost the plot. The contours of transition and power reconfiguration now rests in Zanu PF, where ED Mnangagwa has been whitewashed of his past and repackaged as a reformist in contrast to G40’s dynastic ambitions. What the long-term future holds regarding opportunities for power configuration is not easily apparent given the fluidity of ZANU PF’s succession matrix, and possibly a ‘wild card’ from the the opposition camp, but the short-term seems clearly painted. Yet ED lacks clarity on policy options. On one hand, he is inclined on pushing a failed neo-liberal agenda that places business at the centre of development, on another hand he is pushing for a developmental autocratic state under a ‘command economy’ with command agriculture as the flagship. Will this bring about economic progress, power reconfiguration and transformation in Zimbabwe? This is the material question connected to the National question, identified by Moyo and Yeros in 2011.

 Fig 1.3 Has Transition Power Shifted Back to the Securocrats?

But, to an extent, does an ED leadership signify power reconfigurations? In other words, will command agriculture bring about food sovereignty, supply inputs to industry and create jobs, generate exports? Will command agriculture generate wealth and will farmers accumulate adequately to propel upward mobility and economic growth? Will command infrastructure development be sustainable ? Will these new policies adequately drive transformation in Zimbabwe? Obviously, the scope of this paper does not permit for a comprehensive response to all these questions, suffice to say, at the least, national politics is being redefined from within Zanu PF and with the power matrix influenced by the realities of the reconfigured political economy.

Fig 1.4 Warring Over Command Agriculture: Truce ?

To the extent that the opposition movement are not engaged in these debates, choosing to concentrate on electoral reforms instead and yet Jonathan Moyo has already spilled the thinking in ZANU PF that they cannot reform themselves out of power. This means as they over concentrate on civil and political liberties concerns at the expense of broader structural political economy questions, they will misson providing solutions to the daily struggles of the people or making them their priority. Instead, opportunities to take state power becomes the primary concern of the opposition. What will happen is that little will be achieved by way of reforms and sympathy may continue to shift back to the failed and fractured Zanu PF, leading to another augh moment, come 2018. Maybe, Zimbabwe’s opposition may take cue from Dr Magure’s work, “Land, indigenisation and empowerment narratives that made a difference in the 2013 Elections” or civil society can learn from Chirimambowa and Chimedza’s reflection on its historically contested role in the 2013 elections. Both articles point to the limited nature of over-investing in the liberal rights discourse at the expense of addressing the structural political economy questions around land and economy.

I have avoided delving into the coalition debate and its attendant pros and cons deliberately because the hegemonic historical bloc signified by the dominance of the ZANU PF octopus like machinery puts paid alternative effort in the absence of a comprehensive counter-hegemonic formations with superior governmental infrastructural presence and hold to the electoral system. A ‘grand’ coalition is a drop in the ocean. In any case, this article is about power and transformation’s connection with the land question, the national question being the plenary, within a fluid political economy. The role of organic intellectuals is to paint pictures for actors to  venerate!

I rest my case.

Dr Toendeipi Shonhe, is a Research Associate of the Sam  Moyo Agrarian Institute  and has a PhD from the University of KwaZulu Natal.

War Veterans: Liberation & Zimbabwe’s Post-Independence Transformation

Tamuka C. Chirimambowa and Tinashe L. Chimedza*

War Veterans: Coming from The Cold ?

Recently, the war veterans gathered again and issued some very high sounding statements which are worth analyzing to understand what this means for Zimbabwe’s quick sand political terrain.  At the meeting the War Vets declared that they were opposed to a ‘dynasty’ meaning that they will oppose any attempt to make Grace Mugabe the next president of Zimbabwe. Amongst many other things the War Vets also put it clearly that they ‘are returning to the people’ and they want Zimbabwe to be governed as a democracy because, they stated, this is what ‘we fought for’. The War Vets Association had to get a High Court Order to have their meeting after police, as usual and routine, had stated that the meeting was ‘unsanctioned’ and would not be allowed to go to ahead.  The contradiction was not lost that the War Vets had to get an order from the the same bench where judges cowered, shivered and locked the doors in their chambers when Hitler Hunzvi was bent on some disciplining of his own. These events raise fundamental questions of the democratisation of the polity and have been one of the key areas of contestation in independent Zimbabwe.  So the paradox here is not lost since the War Vets had to resort to the same courts that civil society and Zimbabwe’s fragmented opposition have been saying must be independent.

The question which arises is: if the war veterans are coming in and ‘coming in from the cold’ what is the political impact of all these contestations especially considering that Zimbabwe has entered a period of dangerous fluidity. In that flux, the contestations even within the ruling elites, are becoming sharpened and everyday these conflicts boil over as evidenced by the demonstrations against Sandi Moyo and even Saviour Kasukuwere.  We gather, however, that these things only happen at the instigation of the ‘palace’ because, as we know, otherwise the black-boots would have been swooping and stomping on some necks. The fissures are threatening to swallow the whole court and the jesters and we pray that the junior officers keep their heads cool and no ‘gunpowder and bayonets’ are used to settle the matter. Yet we are also aware that these moments of flux when party-state power is at stake adventurists are abound and those with Bonaparte's inclinations  of marching to the palace with some tanks and machine guns are watching with salivating glands. 

Manifestos: the ghost of Mgagao  and Zimbabwe’s Future

The war vets  fired the first salvo in which they openly challenged the palace and criticized what they called ‘the systematic entrenchment of dictatorial tendencies, personified by the President and his cohorts’ and further that this has resulted in a collapsed economy, rampant corruption and suffering of people’. Considering that the last such robust statement last came in the mid-1970s when the guerillas, gathered at Mgagao, and supported the rise of Robert Mugabe , the declaration was quickly labelled a Mgagao Number 2.  While the party-state apparatus went ballistic and accused the War Vets of ‘treason’ civil society and the opposition lauded the statement as a welcome breadth of fresh air from a social bloc which has always been seen as too much imbricated in the party-state apparatus of rule. The party-state apparatus was roused into action and the War Vets were denounced as ‘rogue’, ‘counter-revolutionaries’ and  attempts were made to quickly gather them at the Harare Sports centre and the dear leader being foisted on the agenda. That was a phyrric victory because attempts to topple Chris Mutsvangwa, the Chair and his Executive  proved an impossible feat and the oligarchy was checkmated.

1.5 Dzinashe Machingura:  formed the Zimbabwe Liberators Platform

On some level the declarations by the War Vets are welcome because they seem to broaden the array of social forces that want a democratic post-colonial polity.  However, we must engage this with ‘one eye open’ because the War Vets must also be willing to understand that the same democratic statutes they support must protect the citizens from a party-state electoral process which is railroaded with a pre-determined outcome. The essence of democracy is such that the contestation for political office must be open and  and any citizen must feel free to participate without the risk of what Professor Masipula Sithole called the ‘margin of terror’.

Liberating the War Vets from the Clutches of the Party-State

In the 1990s a group of war vets assembled under the Zimbabwe Liberators Platform (ZLP), led by the legendary ZIPA Commander, Dzinashe Machingura, and his appeal  was that Zimbabwe’s War Vets must act above political parties. For that attempt he provoked the state propaganda, was bitterly opposed and when he died many of his former comrades stayed away from his funeral because they feared the reprisal that would follow. Under the present circumstances, it seems the current War Vets Executive is actively mobilizing the War Vets but they are driving the same into a cul de sac of supporting a Mnangagwa Presidency. Effectively they are being sucked into a factional battle within the party-state apparatus. Unless the War Vets stand outside and above the factional battle-lines it seems the trust from citizens will remain remote.

Fig 1.6 War Vets: How far will they ‘democratize’ ?

National liberation was also a struggle for democratization and those that lead that process cannot re-mobilize the people only to hand them over to a new Stalin and use that new support to bargain for their own seat at the table rather than for a genuinely people oriented developmental project. Yesterday’s Stalin was delivered to Zimbabwe via a personality cult that was built on the legitimacy of the liberation project and we as Zimbabweans must reject that another Stalin be delivered to us on the basis of a narrow conception of the liberation narrative. That we must refuse and the War Vets have to get this loud and very clear.

Post-Colonial Movements: Liberation as a Continuum

It is not lost that the efforts of the War Veterans to revile personality cult and dynastic politics is not different to the struggles that opposition political formations and civil society have been fighting against ever since independence. It is our contention that efforts by Zimbabwe’s civil society in grappling with the question of how to build broader platforms of participation with enough social and political power to defend the ordinary citizen from state excesses and ideally entrench a more democratic polity is a pursuit of the ideals of the liberation struggle. Therefore, whether it is #ThisFlag, #Tajamuka, Lawyers at Abameli, Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, Combined Harare Residents Association, Zimbabwe Liberator’s Platform, Bulawayo Agenda, the protests by Vendors organisations, #OccupyAfricaUnitySquare and of late the War Veterans, it is the puruit of the unfinished business of independence that informs their demands.

The current political shifts and turns in our polity point to two important questions that have to be interrogated and comprehended; firstly, how does the contemporary civil society frame its political contestation without breaking with history? That is to say how does the present generation ‘fulfil its mission’ without burying history and with it the trajectory of the promises of liberation and decolonisation? Secondly what can civil society learn from the historical development both of the liberation movement as it mobilised against colonialism and settlerism and how did the post-colonial civil society frame its political trajectory with the realities of an independent Zimbabwe in which the promise of liberation was collapsing. However, this unity should see beyond Mugabe the person and chart a transformative agenda that seeks to complete the unfinished liberation struggle of the independence. Brian Kagoro’s wisdom at a Crisis in Zimbabwe national convergence meeting pointly offers a way out as he characterised the post-liberation generation struggles as equally heroic to the War Veterans. For Kagoro, the women’s fight for the Legal Age of Majority Act and the demands by labour, students and churches to democratise the state and economy were a continuation of the liberation project. In short, we call for any discussions on a post-Mugabe order to centre around the national question in typical Fanon style where the unfinished business of independence is taken to its logical conclusion. This means creating a counter-hegemonic narrative that practically addresses the questions of Land, Indigenisation, Citizenship and Governance, which then becomes a basis of building a counter-power of citizenship activism.

 The adopted 2013 constitution offers a way out of the contentious question of land, indigenisation, citizenship, nature of the state and governance. It is our view that a return to the constitution may assist in establishing a framework of engagement that recognises history and at the same does not get stuck in it but provides solutions to the present and tomorrow.

*Tamuka C. Chirimambowa and Tinashe L. Chimedza are the Co-Editors of Gravitas. Tamuka is a PhD fellow at the University of Johannesburg and Tinashe Chimedza studied Social Inquiry.

Women and Politics in Zimbabwe:  Beyond the New Constitution

Paidamwoyo Mukumbiri*

37 years of independence: counting the gains and loses

As Zimbabwe is celebrating its 37 years of independence, it is good to reflect on how independence has changed the status of women.  The legal framework has indeed improved the legal position of women : starting with the Legal Age of Majority Act which recognised women as majors and therefore giving them an opportunity  to contract without the assistance of a guardian. The 2013 constitution provides for equality between men and women in social, political and economic opportunities. Harmful cultural practices such as child marriages and pledging of girls that results in discrimination and oppression of women have been outlawed by the Domestic Violence Act.  Women are now independent when it comes to selection of spouses without entering into forced marriages. They are also eligible for appointment as legal guardians to their minor children.  While the developments in law might appear to paint a bright picture, the social and political lives of women are still stagnant. In the political circles women are still considered as the ‘other’ and men as the natural ‘leaders’. Independence for women has not improved their economic and political position. Discrimination in still rampant in the world of politics and women have not been able to be recognised, especially their full capacity as political leaders. As we reflect on the gains of independence, we should not forget that there is a still a glass ceiling as statistics for women. The economic and political spaces are being controlled by men at the exclusion of women.

The Morning After the Feast

As we are now in the morning after the feast of the  8^th of March 2017 where the  International Women’s Day theme ‘be bold for change’ was meant to inspire women we still realise patriarchy is still deeply enterenched in Zimbabwean society. The lived experiences of women in Zimbabwe narrates a story where the progressive realisation of gender equality is still pitted  against some depressing statistics:  1 in 3 women between the ages of 15-19 is reported to have been subjected to sexual violence; women are dying at child birth; of the 57 companies listed on the  ZSE few are headed by women; of a cabinet of 31 ministers only 4 are women. These catastrophic statistics persist despite Zimbabwe having one of the most liberal constitution which has specific protections of women’s rights. A report by the Research and Advocacy Unit (RAU, 2011) recorded horrifying stories of women being raped, abused and sexually violated for holding differing political views, a very disturbing trend. These are the stark realities that one has to contend with when the gender debate is put on a continuum after the pleasantries, food and wine of the International Women’s Day and soon to be 18^th of April 2017 Independence Celebrations.

Fig 1.7 Women in politics: Are they just Pawns ?

The reforming of the Constitution and legal framework alone is no panacea to resolving the gender inequalities in the Zimbabwean society but are part of the many progressive steps to be taken until women achieve true liberation.  I therefore, argue that the solution of making these laws and policies effective lies in women becoming more engaged citizens especially in the political and economic arena. It is from the political arena that the exclusion of women, the abuse of their dignity and discrimination radiates to the rest of the society including in economics.  Access to political power is still influenced by social, cultural, economic and even religious factors which negatively stigmatize politically active women and this reduces effective participation by women. Zimbabwe’s electoral politics and the contestation for state power has been often very violent, dominated by men and in certain cases women have been targets of electoral violence.  In essence the environment of politics has been a dog eat dog, rendering most women vulnerable and victims of the ‘macho’ logic of patriarchy, and what this entails is the need for women to be not only bold but also be united and tap in their demographic numerical advantage standing at 53% in relation to men. Maybe, some ideas of sistahood (sisterhood) calling for women to women solidarity advanced by Katswe may be the magic bullet that women need as they hold the numbers game.

Not yet Uhuru: So Near But So Far!

When women have successfully overcome the burden at parliamentary election and get elected as members of Parliament, they again face exclusion from appointment in key decision making positions such as cabinet ministers. Currently, women constitute 11% of cabinet ministers with only 4 women in cabinet. History has shown that no woman has been appointed to head ministry of Finance, Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Home Affairs. The general trend has been to allocate ministries such as Gender and Community Development and the Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprises to women. In Zimbabwe’s history, there has never been any known appointed woman Minister of Defence, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs and Mining which are considered to be key or hard power segments of government. At the Reserve Bank, the best highest position women have occupied is Deputy Governor despite holding superior qualifications than their male bosses.

As a matter of fact, recently retired and appointed Deputy Reserve Bank Governors, Charity Dhliwayo and Jesimen Tarisai Chipika, respectively hold superior and earned PhD qualifications in relevant fields. The Big Question begs: under what circumstances will Zimbabwe have a Female Reserve Bank Governor. On the other hand, in the cabinet the following few women head these ministries: Honorable Nyasha Chikwinya who is the Minister of Women Affairs, Gender and Community Development; Oppah Muchinguri who is the Minister for Environment, Water and Climate change; Honorable Sithembiso Nyoni heads the Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprises Cooperative Development and Priscilla Mupfumira   is the Minister of Labour, Public Services and Social services. The lack of women in powerful state positions is a general reflection of how Zimbabwe’s political terrain is skewed in favour of male leaders and this might be a remnant of feudal thinking when the ancient kingdoms of Africa were dominated by men rather than women.

When Greenwood Can Burn, Whither Drywood?

The challenge of gender inequality pervades across political divide and is not only a problem in government and the ruling party. This attests to the thesis that gender disparities are a society-centric problem rather than a single entity of society. The issue of aligning oneself to the powerful faction becomes a necessity. All the top leadership of ZANU PF is male. The president and the two vice presidents are men. This is a similar position at Movement for Democratic Change where a constitutional amendment had to be enacted retrospectively to dwarf Madam Thokozani Khupe with an extra two male vice, even though the party president is already a male. However, without even going for a single election already, ZIMPF ruptured as there was discontent, strife and lack of respect for Dr Joice Mujuru’s leadership.  Some of the ZIMPF male counterparts, claimed Joice Mujuru belonged to the kitchen and bedroom, thus has no place in leadership because she is a woman, a thinking that cannot be permissible in a modern world.

All this is happening against a backdrop of a very progressive Constitution that provides for gender equality as one of the national objectives and founding values of Zimbabwe.  Section 56(2) provides that women and men have the right to equal treatment, including the right to equal opportunities in political, economic, cultural and social spheres. Section 80 further protects women’s participation in politics. It provides that ‘every woman has full and equal dignity of the person with men and this includes equal opportunities in political, economic and social activities.’ However, as presented in this article, it is clear that even in the so-called expected enlightened segments of society, women are still to smash the glass ceilings prompting observe that: if Greenwood can burn with ease, whither the Drywood.

Power: What Power Beyond the Husbands?

Dr Joice Mujuru was married to the late General Mujuru who was well respected within ZANU PF and the military. Dr Amai Grace Mugabe is also proving to be a force to reckon in Zimbabwe’s political landscape.  Her rallies command a lot of people including the most powerful members of the ruling party.  She leaves no stone unturned and there is no sacred cow that cannot be touched in her speeches.  What needs to be interrogated is the question on whether these two women would have achieved so much without being related to powerful men.

Fig 1.8 Joice Mujuru: Used and Discarded ?

If Dr Amai Mugabe was just a secretary of ZANU PF women’s league without being the President’s wife would she have managed  to command power within ZANU PF enormously as she is doing or it would have been the reported case of dragging her in the tar (kuzvuzvurudzwa mutara). Dr Joice Mujuru’s case after the death of  General Solomon Mujuru clearly gives credence to the thesis that without alliance to male relationships, women struggle to make it in politics.

Miles Tendi in his 2016 work State Intelligence and the Politics of Zimbabwe’s Presidential Succession observes how gendered dimensions of surveillance reinforced patriarchal notions of politics as revealed in the first lady’s revelation that Joice was busy plotting the downfall of Mugabe semi-naked in a miniskirt, a generally reviled dressing in patriarchal Zimbabwe. Mujuru’s leadership of the Zimbabwe Peoples’ First party was short lived and she had to form the National People’s Party.The failure to address power imbalances certainly detracts the progressive nature of the Constitution. It should be borne in mind that the law does not operate in isolation.  Religious, social and economic factors negatively impact the implementation of the law.  In some cases, these factors collude and inhibit women’s participation from politics and decision making.  What is also clear is that patriarchy as an institution is strongly embedded in the political structures of Zimbabwe. Thus, integration of women in political structures is rather viewed as a necessary evil simply to comply with various regional and international human rights instruments that the country is part of.   Examples of these human instruments include the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa. These human rights instruments mandate states to promote and protect women’s participation in politics and decision making. While these international protocols and the laws are progressive, women

Beyond ‘Canon Fodder’: Women’s Leaders in Political Parties and State Institutions

In order to realise the actual implementation of the Constitution, the issue of power, regardless of its forms need to be confronted head on, as appointment of women to key positions in government should not be a privilege but a right which should be enforced. Women should demand for it and lobby the President to consider qualified women for such appointments.  Women should also support fellow women and stop being patriarchal vanguards.  Women’s participation need to move away from dancing kongonya and ululating for men to setting the agenda. They should bring to the table key issues that improve the general welfare of women first and everyone.  The struggle for gender equality needs to move from the logic of privilege to rights as women also equally fought in the liberation war for independence. Names such as the Late Freedom Nyamubaya, Joice Mujuru, Margaret Dongo, Fay Chung and the legendary Mbuya Nehanda, always remind us of the heroic contribution of women in the fight against colonialism and domination. Participation of women should be both quantitative and qualitative. The qualitative participation includes involvement in key decision making structures and not generally concerned about numbers. Qualitative participation involves the power to make key decisions without rubber stamping notions that you do not subscribe to. But at the end of the day, women need to  make the new constitution and independence a lived reality by active citizenship.  

*Paidamwoyo Mukumbiri is a Lawyer & Lectures at Zimbabwe Ezekiel Guti University.